San Antonio Court of Appeals Rules in Firefighters' Legal Fight Over Collective Bargaining

International Association of Fire Fighters Local 624 v. The City of San Antonio,
No. (Tex. App.- San Antonio, November 21, 2007) (Opinion by Justice Simmons) (Texas firefighter litigation legal case)
Panel members: Justices Stone, Angelini and Simmons
Appeal from 285th District Court of Bexar County

This appeal follows a bench trial in a declaratory judgment action. The trial court held the City of San Antonio ("City") did not violate Texas law when it appointed a fire fighter and Union member to its negotiation team in anticipation of upcoming collective bargaining negotiations.

Because the relevant statute does not limit the designation of persons to negotiate or bargain, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In preparation for collective bargaining negotiations, both the City and the International Association of Fire Fighters Local 624 (the "Union") designated individuals to serve on their negotiating teams. The City designated Assistant Chief Noel T. Horan ("Horan") to serve on its negotiation team. The agreed stipulations by the parties provide that Horan is a fire fighter, a member of the Union and benefits from the collective bargaining agreement. The Union believes this appointment conflicts with the underlying policies, statutory construction and legislative intent of Chapter 174 of the Local Government Code, as defined by the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act (the "Act"). Accordingly, the Union sought declaratory relief, and its petition sought a declaration "that the Act prohibits the participation of 'fire fighters' employed by the CITY as part of the CITY's negotiations team in contract negotiations conducted pursuant to Chapter 174 of the Texas Local Government Code." After a bench trial, the trial court denied the relief sought and this appeal ensued. This is a case of first impression for this court.

Standard of Review

Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, a person whose rights are affected by a statute may have a court determine any question of construction arising under the statute and may obtain a declaration of his rights under the same. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002 (Vernon 1997). The Union bore the burden of proof before the trial court. Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 193 284 S.W.2d 340, 350 (1955); McLeod v. City of San Antonio, 702 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1985, writ refused n.r.e.). An appellate court reviews declaratory judgments under the same standards as other judgments and decrees. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.010; Guthery v. Taylor, 112 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

Statutory Construction

If the question presented on appeal is one of statutory construction, then it is a question of law mandating a de novo review. State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). When the language at issue is clear and unambiguous, we make every effort to give the statute its common meaning and seek the intent of the Legislature as found in the plain meaning of the words and terms used-without resorting to rules of construction or extrinsic aids. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). "'Our role . . . is not to second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results; rather, our task is to interpret those statutes in a manner that effectuates the Legislature's intent.'" F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, No. 02-0381, 2007 WL 1376357, at *8 (Tex. May 11, 2007) (quoting McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. 2003)). To that end, we consider statutory language in context, not in isolation. Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1988); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). When ascertaining legislative intent, we may also consider the objective of the law, its history, and the consequences of a particular construction. Jones, 969 S.W.2d at 432.

1. Chapter 174

Both parties direct this court to Section 174.106 as the principal statute to be construed. Section 174. 106 provides, in its entirety:

A public employer or an association may designate one or more persons to negotiate or bargain on its behalf. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 174.106 (Vernon 1999). The City asserts that a plain reading of Section 174.106 allows either party, without limitation, to designate individuals of their choosing to negotiate on their behalf. The Union, on the other hand, argues that although nothing in the Act prohibits participation by Horan as an "information resource," Section 174.106 must be read in light of the stated purpose of the entire statute - to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, because the statute necessarily requires the parties to work together, but on opposite sides, the Act cannot allow Horan, a Union member, to serve as a "negotiator" for the City.

Appellate courts have long recognized that any particular section of an act cannot be construed in a vacuum, but must be viewed through the "entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction." Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991). We, therefore, look to the entire chapter for guidance. See Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001) (holding that appellate review must consider a statute as a whole, rather than focusing on isolated provisions).

Although Section 174.004 requires a liberal construction of Chapter 174, the Union urges that such authority cannot be limitless or absurd results would follow. More specifically, the Union argues Section 174.106 must be read in conjunction with Section 174.101, which provides:
A public employer shall recognize an association selected by a majority of the fire fighters of the fire department of a political subdivision as the exclusive bargaining agent for the fire fighters of that department unless a majority of the fire fighters withdraw the recognition. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 174.101.

The Union continues that Horan's appointment to the City's team means the City will use Horan as a bargaining agent for the Union even though the Union did not designate him to negotiate on its behalf. The Union asserts that Section 174.106 cannot be interpreted to allow limitless designation of the negotiation team because Section 174.101 provides the Union the exclusive right to bargain on behalf of the fire fighters.

2. Analysis

Section 174.106 is clear and unambiguous. It allows either party to designate persons to
negotiate on their behalf. To negotiate is "to confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 777 (10th ed. 1993) (emphasis added). Nothing in the statute requires each member of a negotiating team be "adversarial" to the opposing party or precludes the appointment of persons conciliatory to the opposing side of the negotiation. We hesitate to engraft such a limitation on the statute.

The Union attempts to distinguish between the City's right to use Union members as resources and the use of Union members as negotiators. (1) Yet, the Union fails to provide any authority for the proposition that an individual cannot be both a negotiator and act as a resource to the City. This court is required to apply the plain meaning of the statute. Here, the statute provides that the City may designate individuals of its choosing to negotiate on its behalf. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 174.106.

We recognize that it is counterintuitive that the City would want someone "from the other side," in their inner sanctum during negotiations. By imposing no specific limits on the selection of the negotiating team, section 174.106 appears to leave room for conflicts of interest and possible abuse of the system, constrained only by the good faith conferral requirement of Section 174.105. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 174.105 (Vernon 1999).

However, we are bound by the statute, as written. There are no limitations in the section and the Union has failed to provide any authority or statutory basis upon which to restrict the City's authority to freely appoint its negotiation team. Thus, although compelling, the arguments of the Union can only be addressed through legislative intervention. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of the requested declaration.

Attorneys' Fees

The Union brought this action pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act which provides that the trial court "may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009. The grant or denial of attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action is, however, within the trial court's discretion and attorney's fees may be awarded to parties seeking declaratory relief, even when they do not prevail. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 637 (Tex. 1996) (citing Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985)). An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant or denial for an abuse of discretion. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998).

Here, the trial court heard testimony regarding the Union's attorney's fees and after argument of counsel, the court stated "[w]e would have to take up attorney's fees had you prevailed, but when it's denied, I don't think I have to." Although the Union appears to rely on this statement to show that the trial court acted arbitrarily, the court's statement during the hearing is not a formal finding of fact or conclusion of law. See Intec Syss., Inc. v. Lowrey, 230 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2007, no pet.) ("A court's oral statements 'cannot substitute' for findings and conclusions."); Gibson v. Bostick Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 148 S.W.3d 482, 494 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding that court's comment on the record that "Brown was put in a position of at least apparent authority to enter into an agreement" was an oral comment and did not constitute a finding of fact or conclusion of law); Sharp v. Hobart Corp., 957 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, no pet.) (holding that the court's comments and the language of the order do not constitute formal findings of fact and conclusions of law and appellate court cannot assume the court denied the requested attorney's fees for the reason suggested by counsel).

Further, even if the trial court's reasoning was incorrect, this does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion. See Texas Workers' Comp. Com'n v. Wausau Underwriters, Ins., 127 S.W.3d 50, 58-59 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (stating "A trial court does not err if it makes the correct ruling for the wrong reason"). The trial court heard the evidence, listened to argument of counsel, and signed an order denying the requested fees. Because the Union has failed to establish that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion, we affirm the denial of the Union's attorney's fees under the declaratory judgment statute.

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

1. As a practical matter, the Union characterizes a resource person as someone available to both parties at the negotiating table to answer questions that might arise.

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2005-CI-19241
Honorable Rene Diaz, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 21, 2007

AFFIRMED

FIND TERMS: Texas firefighter cases litigation pay disputes, labor unions, collective bargaining, representation, agency, Texas Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA), declararatory judgment and attorney's fees