Sunday, June 17, 2007

Employer Not Liable for Car Accident Caused by Exhausted Employee With Company Vehicle

Texas Supreme Court Rules for Employer in Appeal From Suit by Victim of Car Crash Caused by Employee Who Fell Asleep At the Wheel

Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Mayes, No. 04-0993 (Tex. Jun 15, 2007)(per curiam) (negligence, negligent entrustment, respondeat superior)

Full case style: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Patrick Mayes; from Harris County;
Appellate Court and Opinion below: First Court of Appeals, No. 01-03-00157-CV, 144 S.W.3d 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2004)
Disposition: Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court reverses the First Court of Appeals' judgment and renders judgment for the Defendant.

Court holds that accident did not occur in the course and scope of employee's duties

Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee’s actions are within the course and scope of his employment. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998). “[A]n employer is liable for its employee’s tort only when the tortious act falls within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002) (citing Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971)).The employee’s acts must be of the same general nature as the conduct authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized to be within the scope of employment. Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577 (citing Smith v. M Sys. Food Stores, Inc., 297 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1957)). Accordingly, “if an employee deviates from the performance of his duties for his own purposes, the employer is not responsible for what occurs during that deviation.” Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577.

Employee fell asleep at the wheel while on a personal errand in themiddle of the night and hit Plaintiff's truck head-on. Court holds that the errand was not an act in furtherance of his employer’s business or for the accomplishment of the object for which he was hired. Evidence that Adams had possession of the Goodyear truck with Goodyear tires on board, had a morning delivery to make, was available via pager twenty-four hours a day, and was not restricted from using the truck for personal business fail to support the requirements of respondeat superior.

Supreme Court also reject negligent entrustment claim

To establish liability under this theory, the Plaintiff was required to show that: (1) the employer entrusted the vehicle to the employee; (2) the employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) at the time of the entrustment, the employer knew or should have known that employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (4) the employee was negligent on the occasion in question; and (5) the employee's negligence proximately caused the accident. See Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987).

In this case it was undisputed that Goodyear entrusted its truck to the employee, that the employee was negligent by falling asleep behind the wheel, and that his negligence proximately caused the accident. However, the record contains no evidence that, at the time Goodyear entrusted the vehicle to the employee, the latter was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver or that the employer knew or should have known that the employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver.

Disposition: Dispensing with oral argument, the Supreme Court reverses the Houston Court of Appeals' judgment and renders judgment for the Employer. Plaintiff takes nothing from Goodyear.

Terms: Employer liability for conduct of employee, respondeat superior, personal injury, PI-auto, automobile accidents, car crashes, negligence, negligent entrustment, negligence per se

Monday, June 4, 2007

Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedter (Tex. 2007)

Hospitals treating workers’ compensation patients are bound by Texas Labor Code’s cap on reimbursement, and may not pursue claim for difference against the injured worker, or file lien.

Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedter, No. 05-0108 (Tex. Jun. 1, 2007)(Brister)(workers comp discount)

In this case stemming from a work-related automobile accident the Texas Supreme Court examined whether a hospital may file a lien against a patient's cause of action for tort damages based on the difference between the payment from the workers' compensation carrier and the full amount of its charges for treatment. It was undisputed that the hospital had been paid all it was due in worker's compensation under the Labor Code guidelines. The Court rules that the hospital cannot sue the patient for the discount, and may not place a lien on his tort recovery either. Workers’ compensation fee guidelines in the Labor Code are intended to provide both fair and reasonable reimbursement and effective cost control. If a hospital believes it is entitled to more money, it may avail itself of administrative remedies. In holding that the hospital’s lien violated the Labor Code’s prohibition of private claims against compensation patients, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below.