Contract Damages Barred by Statute of Frauds; Fraud Theory Fails Because if Was Used as a Creative Alternative to Circumvent the Statute of Frauds and Collect the Same Damages
In this employment dispute the Supreme Court holds that a volleyball coach could not pursue a fraud claim as an alternative theory of recovery where his breach of contract claim was barred, and the damages he sought were the same. In a prior appeal the reviewing court had held that Sonnichson's breach-of-contract claim based on an oral promise to enter into a contract that could not be performed within one year was precluded by the statute of frauds. Although a written draft contract surfaced in the course of discovery, it had never been delivered, thus defeating the mutual assent element required for a binding written contract. The Supreme Court also holds that the trial court properly denied an opportunity to amend after sustaining special exceptions, and properly granted summary judgment for the university, because the defect in Plaintiff's cause was incurable. The Court renders judgment that the coach take nothing.
Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, No. 04-0851 (Tex. Apr. 20, 2007)(per curiam)
Find terms: employment contracts, wrongful termination, measure of damages
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Saturday, April 21, 2007
Deputy Entitled to Procedural Due Process in Political Dismissal
Texas Supreme Court Holds that Discontinued Deputy Constable
Was Entitled to Grievance Hearing
County of Dallas v. Walton, No. 04-0631 (Tex. Feb 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Deputy Constable Lamar Walton was not resworn after new Dallas County Constable took office. Deputy, who was a civil service employee, sued county for damages and reinstatement alleging deprivation of his constitutional due process rights. The new Constable and the County relied on Deputy's signed acknowledgment that his employment was at will.
The Supreme Court holds that a constable cannot unilaterally remove covered deputies from the civil service system by requiring the waiver, and that the deputy's signed statement thus had no legal effect. The Court determines that Deputy Walton has a valid procedural due process claim because he was denied a grievance hearing before the civil service commission, and remands to the trial court for further proceedings.
Companion case: County of Dallas v. Wiland (Tex. Feb. 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Find terms: Texas at will employment, civil service system, public employee, governmental entities, section 1983 action, CRA, due process, protected interest
Was Entitled to Grievance Hearing
County of Dallas v. Walton, No. 04-0631 (Tex. Feb 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Deputy Constable Lamar Walton was not resworn after new Dallas County Constable took office. Deputy, who was a civil service employee, sued county for damages and reinstatement alleging deprivation of his constitutional due process rights. The new Constable and the County relied on Deputy's signed acknowledgment that his employment was at will.
The Supreme Court holds that a constable cannot unilaterally remove covered deputies from the civil service system by requiring the waiver, and that the deputy's signed statement thus had no legal effect. The Court determines that Deputy Walton has a valid procedural due process claim because he was denied a grievance hearing before the civil service commission, and remands to the trial court for further proceedings.
Companion case: County of Dallas v. Wiland (Tex. Feb. 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Find terms: Texas at will employment, civil service system, public employee, governmental entities, section 1983 action, CRA, due process, protected interest
Firefighters Fight in Texas Supreme Court Nets Partial Victory
Texas Supreme Court Decides Two More Firefighter Appeals
March 9, 2007 - Supreme Court hands down two more opinions in appeals from suits by municipal fire fighters over compensation. The unifying theme in these cases is whether their employing local governments are immune from such suits. City of Dallas v. Dora Saucedo-Falls, et al.,No. 05-0973 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam) City of Sweetwater, Texas v. Waddell, et al,No. 05-1033 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam)
In City of Dallas v. Saucedo-Falls, the City had asserted a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and attorneys fees against the plaintiffs' suit complaining about denial of a pay raise, but had later filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and sought dismissal. Plaintiffs successfully argued in the trial court and on appeal that the city had waived its immunity by its conduct. In deciding the City's interlocutory appeal in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court did not announce any new precedent, but remanded the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to argue any viable immunity waiver in the wake of the Legislature's enactment of a limited statutory waiver of local government immunity, which occurred while the case was pending, and its recent sovereign immunity decisions, specifically its holdings in Tooke v. Mexia, and its second opinion in an earlier case involving the City of Dallas, in which it found that the city had waived immunity by filing a claim for affirmative relief of its own. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006); Loc. Gov't Code §§271.151-.160.
In the Sweetwater case, which was factually similar, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea to the firefighters' claims and dismissed their suit with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs were successful in arguing that the "sue and be sued" language in the city' charter waived its immunity.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, had reversed long-standing precedent for that proposition when it decided Tooke v. City of Mexia and a batch of companion cases at the end of June last year. Following its newly established precedent, the Court thus reversed the Eastland Court of Appeal's judgment and sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs could proceed under the newly enacted legislation authorizing suits against local governments subject to certain limitations.
Cases cited:
Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994) (holding, in an action construing the compulsory school attendance law, that the Declaratory Judgments Act, by authorizing actions to construe legislative enactments and attorney fee awards, "necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards")
City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2006)
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006)
Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 n.1) (Tex. 1997)(waiver by conduct)
Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006)
Find terms: sovereign immunity, plea to the jurisdiction, immune from suit
March 9, 2007 - Supreme Court hands down two more opinions in appeals from suits by municipal fire fighters over compensation. The unifying theme in these cases is whether their employing local governments are immune from such suits. City of Dallas v. Dora Saucedo-Falls, et al.,No. 05-0973 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam) City of Sweetwater, Texas v. Waddell, et al,No. 05-1033 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam)
In City of Dallas v. Saucedo-Falls, the City had asserted a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and attorneys fees against the plaintiffs' suit complaining about denial of a pay raise, but had later filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and sought dismissal. Plaintiffs successfully argued in the trial court and on appeal that the city had waived its immunity by its conduct. In deciding the City's interlocutory appeal in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court did not announce any new precedent, but remanded the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to argue any viable immunity waiver in the wake of the Legislature's enactment of a limited statutory waiver of local government immunity, which occurred while the case was pending, and its recent sovereign immunity decisions, specifically its holdings in Tooke v. Mexia, and its second opinion in an earlier case involving the City of Dallas, in which it found that the city had waived immunity by filing a claim for affirmative relief of its own. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006); Loc. Gov't Code §§271.151-.160.
In the Sweetwater case, which was factually similar, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea to the firefighters' claims and dismissed their suit with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs were successful in arguing that the "sue and be sued" language in the city' charter waived its immunity.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, had reversed long-standing precedent for that proposition when it decided Tooke v. City of Mexia and a batch of companion cases at the end of June last year. Following its newly established precedent, the Court thus reversed the Eastland Court of Appeal's judgment and sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs could proceed under the newly enacted legislation authorizing suits against local governments subject to certain limitations.
Cases cited:
Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994) (holding, in an action construing the compulsory school attendance law, that the Declaratory Judgments Act, by authorizing actions to construe legislative enactments and attorney fee awards, "necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards")
City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2006)
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006)
Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 n.1) (Tex. 1997)(waiver by conduct)
Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006)
Find terms: sovereign immunity, plea to the jurisdiction, immune from suit
Substitute Teacher Rejected Too Many Assignments - Loses Age Discrimination Suit
Low Rate of Accepting Assignments Dooms Substitute Teacher's Age Discrimination Suit; Summary Judgment for School District Affirmed
Lucille R. Kelley v. Humble I.S.D. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2007, pet. denied 8/17/07)(Alcala)
In this wrongful termination suit brought by a former substitute teacher under the state anti-discrimination statute, the First Court of Appeals holds that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, but nevertheless affirms the summary judgment for the school district, finding that she had failed to show that the reason given by the school district was pretextual.
The school district presented summary judgment evidence that Lucille Kelley had accepted a low number of teaching assignments in response to calls from the automated SubFinder scheduling system, and that she was fired for that reason. In a memorandum opinion, Justice Alcala holds that the Plaintiff had met her initial burden with evidence that she was replaced by younger subs, but that she had not overcome the district's proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing her: limited availability and low acceptance rate of assignments offered to her. Plaintiff's evidence that the school district's logs were not fully accurate did not establish pretext.
Justice Alcala also rejects Kelley's disparate treatment claim and claim of a general pattern of discrimination based on statistical evidence. Concluding that Kelley had failed to meet her burden to show that the school district's adverse employment action against her was a pretext for age discrimination, or that her age (69 at the time of termination) was a motivating factor in the school district's decision, the court of appeals affirms the summary judgment granted by he 164th District Court in the employer's favor.
Case law categories: Employment Law, School Law, ISD Cases
Find terms: Employment law, public employment, discharge, termination, education law, school districts, ISD, TCHRA, age discrimination, prime-facie case, burden-shifting analysis, pretext
Lucille R. Kelley v. Humble I.S.D. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2007, pet. denied 8/17/07)(Alcala)
In this wrongful termination suit brought by a former substitute teacher under the state anti-discrimination statute, the First Court of Appeals holds that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, but nevertheless affirms the summary judgment for the school district, finding that she had failed to show that the reason given by the school district was pretextual.
The school district presented summary judgment evidence that Lucille Kelley had accepted a low number of teaching assignments in response to calls from the automated SubFinder scheduling system, and that she was fired for that reason. In a memorandum opinion, Justice Alcala holds that the Plaintiff had met her initial burden with evidence that she was replaced by younger subs, but that she had not overcome the district's proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing her: limited availability and low acceptance rate of assignments offered to her. Plaintiff's evidence that the school district's logs were not fully accurate did not establish pretext.
Justice Alcala also rejects Kelley's disparate treatment claim and claim of a general pattern of discrimination based on statistical evidence. Concluding that Kelley had failed to meet her burden to show that the school district's adverse employment action against her was a pretext for age discrimination, or that her age (69 at the time of termination) was a motivating factor in the school district's decision, the court of appeals affirms the summary judgment granted by he 164th District Court in the employer's favor.
Case law categories: Employment Law, School Law, ISD Cases
Find terms: Employment law, public employment, discharge, termination, education law, school districts, ISD, TCHRA, age discrimination, prime-facie case, burden-shifting analysis, pretext
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This blog will offer summaries of recent cases from Texas Courts of Appeals dealing with legal aspects of employer-employee relationships and the legal regulation the workplace. It will publish links to court opinions and attempt to make appellate decisions and holdings more accessible to the public through Internet search engines.
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