Sep. 9, 2007 - In its only opinion released with its weekly orders last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court resolved a three-way split among the courts of appeals on the question whether a governmental official sued in his official capacity is entitled to seek interlocutory review in the court of appeals when his plea to the jurisdiction is denied by the trial court. The unanimous court, in an opinion by Justice Green answered 'yes', and rendered judgment for the defendants on sovereign immunity grounds. Texas A&M University System v. Sefa Koseoglu, No. 05‑0321 (Tex. 2007)
In dismissing the state employee's claims with prejudice, and denying him an opportunity to replead, the state's court of last resort in civil matters further limited the ability of state employees to bring suits for wrongful termination. The court opined that the plaintiff would not be able to overcome the immunity problem because he was asserting a breach of contract claim, and thus need not be given an opportunity to try again on remand.
The Court's endorsement of dismissal with prejudice on lack of jurisdiction grounds sets a new statewide precedent and marks a further step in the expansion of the sovereign immunity doctrine to privilege and protect the interests of government defendants without regard to the merits of the complaints brought against them, and correspondingly limits the avenues of redress available to aggrieved workers and contractors.
It had previously been generally accepted that dismissal with prejudice is not proper when the a court does not reach the merits of the controversy. Numerous lower-court opinions had given effect to that principle even in pro se and in forma pauperis suits brought by prison inmates. Dismissal with prejudice would presumably make the option to seek legislative permission to sue (immunity waiver by legislative resolution) meaningless as well. Though rare, this method has sometimes been employed to overcome the sovereign immunity defense and establish the state's consent to suit on a claim that would otherwise be dismissed without regard to merits on a plea to the jurisdiction filed by the defendant.
Sunday, September 9, 2007
Sunday, June 17, 2007
Employer Not Liable for Car Accident Caused by Exhausted Employee With Company Vehicle
Texas Supreme Court Rules for Employer in Appeal From Suit by Victim of Car Crash Caused by Employee Who Fell Asleep At the Wheel
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Mayes, No. 04-0993 (Tex. Jun 15, 2007)(per curiam) (negligence, negligent entrustment, respondeat superior)
Full case style: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Patrick Mayes; from Harris County;
Appellate Court and Opinion below: First Court of Appeals, No. 01-03-00157-CV, 144 S.W.3d 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2004)
Disposition: Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court reverses the First Court of Appeals' judgment and renders judgment for the Defendant.
Court holds that accident did not occur in the course and scope of employee's duties
Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee’s actions are within the course and scope of his employment. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998). “[A]n employer is liable for its employee’s tort only when the tortious act falls within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002) (citing Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971)).The employee’s acts must be of the same general nature as the conduct authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized to be within the scope of employment. Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577 (citing Smith v. M Sys. Food Stores, Inc., 297 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1957)). Accordingly, “if an employee deviates from the performance of his duties for his own purposes, the employer is not responsible for what occurs during that deviation.” Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577.
Employee fell asleep at the wheel while on a personal errand in themiddle of the night and hit Plaintiff's truck head-on. Court holds that the errand was not an act in furtherance of his employer’s business or for the accomplishment of the object for which he was hired. Evidence that Adams had possession of the Goodyear truck with Goodyear tires on board, had a morning delivery to make, was available via pager twenty-four hours a day, and was not restricted from using the truck for personal business fail to support the requirements of respondeat superior.
Supreme Court also reject negligent entrustment claim
To establish liability under this theory, the Plaintiff was required to show that: (1) the employer entrusted the vehicle to the employee; (2) the employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) at the time of the entrustment, the employer knew or should have known that employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (4) the employee was negligent on the occasion in question; and (5) the employee's negligence proximately caused the accident. See Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987).
In this case it was undisputed that Goodyear entrusted its truck to the employee, that the employee was negligent by falling asleep behind the wheel, and that his negligence proximately caused the accident. However, the record contains no evidence that, at the time Goodyear entrusted the vehicle to the employee, the latter was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver or that the employer knew or should have known that the employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver.
Disposition: Dispensing with oral argument, the Supreme Court reverses the Houston Court of Appeals' judgment and renders judgment for the Employer. Plaintiff takes nothing from Goodyear.
Terms: Employer liability for conduct of employee, respondeat superior, personal injury, PI-auto, automobile accidents, car crashes, negligence, negligent entrustment, negligence per se
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Mayes, No. 04-0993 (Tex. Jun 15, 2007)(per curiam) (negligence, negligent entrustment, respondeat superior)
Full case style: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Patrick Mayes; from Harris County;
Appellate Court and Opinion below: First Court of Appeals, No. 01-03-00157-CV, 144 S.W.3d 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2004)
Disposition: Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court reverses the First Court of Appeals' judgment and renders judgment for the Defendant.
Court holds that accident did not occur in the course and scope of employee's duties
Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee’s actions are within the course and scope of his employment. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998). “[A]n employer is liable for its employee’s tort only when the tortious act falls within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002) (citing Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971)).The employee’s acts must be of the same general nature as the conduct authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized to be within the scope of employment. Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577 (citing Smith v. M Sys. Food Stores, Inc., 297 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1957)). Accordingly, “if an employee deviates from the performance of his duties for his own purposes, the employer is not responsible for what occurs during that deviation.” Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577.
Employee fell asleep at the wheel while on a personal errand in themiddle of the night and hit Plaintiff's truck head-on. Court holds that the errand was not an act in furtherance of his employer’s business or for the accomplishment of the object for which he was hired. Evidence that Adams had possession of the Goodyear truck with Goodyear tires on board, had a morning delivery to make, was available via pager twenty-four hours a day, and was not restricted from using the truck for personal business fail to support the requirements of respondeat superior.
Supreme Court also reject negligent entrustment claim
To establish liability under this theory, the Plaintiff was required to show that: (1) the employer entrusted the vehicle to the employee; (2) the employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) at the time of the entrustment, the employer knew or should have known that employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (4) the employee was negligent on the occasion in question; and (5) the employee's negligence proximately caused the accident. See Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987).
In this case it was undisputed that Goodyear entrusted its truck to the employee, that the employee was negligent by falling asleep behind the wheel, and that his negligence proximately caused the accident. However, the record contains no evidence that, at the time Goodyear entrusted the vehicle to the employee, the latter was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver or that the employer knew or should have known that the employee was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver.
Disposition: Dispensing with oral argument, the Supreme Court reverses the Houston Court of Appeals' judgment and renders judgment for the Employer. Plaintiff takes nothing from Goodyear.
Terms: Employer liability for conduct of employee, respondeat superior, personal injury, PI-auto, automobile accidents, car crashes, negligence, negligent entrustment, negligence per se
Monday, June 4, 2007
Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedter (Tex. 2007)
Hospitals treating workers’ compensation patients are bound by Texas Labor Code’s cap on reimbursement, and may not pursue claim for difference against the injured worker, or file lien.
Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedter, No. 05-0108 (Tex. Jun. 1, 2007)(Brister)(workers comp discount)
In this case stemming from a work-related automobile accident the Texas Supreme Court examined whether a hospital may file a lien against a patient's cause of action for tort damages based on the difference between the payment from the workers' compensation carrier and the full amount of its charges for treatment. It was undisputed that the hospital had been paid all it was due in worker's compensation under the Labor Code guidelines. The Court rules that the hospital cannot sue the patient for the discount, and may not place a lien on his tort recovery either. Workers’ compensation fee guidelines in the Labor Code are intended to provide both fair and reasonable reimbursement and effective cost control. If a hospital believes it is entitled to more money, it may avail itself of administrative remedies. In holding that the hospital’s lien violated the Labor Code’s prohibition of private claims against compensation patients, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below.
Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedter, No. 05-0108 (Tex. Jun. 1, 2007)(Brister)(workers comp discount)
In this case stemming from a work-related automobile accident the Texas Supreme Court examined whether a hospital may file a lien against a patient's cause of action for tort damages based on the difference between the payment from the workers' compensation carrier and the full amount of its charges for treatment. It was undisputed that the hospital had been paid all it was due in worker's compensation under the Labor Code guidelines. The Court rules that the hospital cannot sue the patient for the discount, and may not place a lien on his tort recovery either. Workers’ compensation fee guidelines in the Labor Code are intended to provide both fair and reasonable reimbursement and effective cost control. If a hospital believes it is entitled to more money, it may avail itself of administrative remedies. In holding that the hospital’s lien violated the Labor Code’s prohibition of private claims against compensation patients, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below.
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Court Rejects Coach's Fraud Claim as an Artful Alternative to Collect on an Unenforceable Contract
Contract Damages Barred by Statute of Frauds; Fraud Theory Fails Because if Was Used as a Creative Alternative to Circumvent the Statute of Frauds and Collect the Same Damages
In this employment dispute the Supreme Court holds that a volleyball coach could not pursue a fraud claim as an alternative theory of recovery where his breach of contract claim was barred, and the damages he sought were the same. In a prior appeal the reviewing court had held that Sonnichson's breach-of-contract claim based on an oral promise to enter into a contract that could not be performed within one year was precluded by the statute of frauds. Although a written draft contract surfaced in the course of discovery, it had never been delivered, thus defeating the mutual assent element required for a binding written contract. The Supreme Court also holds that the trial court properly denied an opportunity to amend after sustaining special exceptions, and properly granted summary judgment for the university, because the defect in Plaintiff's cause was incurable. The Court renders judgment that the coach take nothing.
Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, No. 04-0851 (Tex. Apr. 20, 2007)(per curiam)
Find terms: employment contracts, wrongful termination, measure of damages
In this employment dispute the Supreme Court holds that a volleyball coach could not pursue a fraud claim as an alternative theory of recovery where his breach of contract claim was barred, and the damages he sought were the same. In a prior appeal the reviewing court had held that Sonnichson's breach-of-contract claim based on an oral promise to enter into a contract that could not be performed within one year was precluded by the statute of frauds. Although a written draft contract surfaced in the course of discovery, it had never been delivered, thus defeating the mutual assent element required for a binding written contract. The Supreme Court also holds that the trial court properly denied an opportunity to amend after sustaining special exceptions, and properly granted summary judgment for the university, because the defect in Plaintiff's cause was incurable. The Court renders judgment that the coach take nothing.
Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, No. 04-0851 (Tex. Apr. 20, 2007)(per curiam)
Find terms: employment contracts, wrongful termination, measure of damages
Saturday, April 21, 2007
Deputy Entitled to Procedural Due Process in Political Dismissal
Texas Supreme Court Holds that Discontinued Deputy Constable
Was Entitled to Grievance Hearing
County of Dallas v. Walton, No. 04-0631 (Tex. Feb 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Deputy Constable Lamar Walton was not resworn after new Dallas County Constable took office. Deputy, who was a civil service employee, sued county for damages and reinstatement alleging deprivation of his constitutional due process rights. The new Constable and the County relied on Deputy's signed acknowledgment that his employment was at will.
The Supreme Court holds that a constable cannot unilaterally remove covered deputies from the civil service system by requiring the waiver, and that the deputy's signed statement thus had no legal effect. The Court determines that Deputy Walton has a valid procedural due process claim because he was denied a grievance hearing before the civil service commission, and remands to the trial court for further proceedings.
Companion case: County of Dallas v. Wiland (Tex. Feb. 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Find terms: Texas at will employment, civil service system, public employee, governmental entities, section 1983 action, CRA, due process, protected interest
Was Entitled to Grievance Hearing
County of Dallas v. Walton, No. 04-0631 (Tex. Feb 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Deputy Constable Lamar Walton was not resworn after new Dallas County Constable took office. Deputy, who was a civil service employee, sued county for damages and reinstatement alleging deprivation of his constitutional due process rights. The new Constable and the County relied on Deputy's signed acknowledgment that his employment was at will.
The Supreme Court holds that a constable cannot unilaterally remove covered deputies from the civil service system by requiring the waiver, and that the deputy's signed statement thus had no legal effect. The Court determines that Deputy Walton has a valid procedural due process claim because he was denied a grievance hearing before the civil service commission, and remands to the trial court for further proceedings.
Companion case: County of Dallas v. Wiland (Tex. Feb. 16, 2007)(Hecht)
Find terms: Texas at will employment, civil service system, public employee, governmental entities, section 1983 action, CRA, due process, protected interest
Firefighters Fight in Texas Supreme Court Nets Partial Victory
Texas Supreme Court Decides Two More Firefighter Appeals
March 9, 2007 - Supreme Court hands down two more opinions in appeals from suits by municipal fire fighters over compensation. The unifying theme in these cases is whether their employing local governments are immune from such suits. City of Dallas v. Dora Saucedo-Falls, et al.,No. 05-0973 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam) City of Sweetwater, Texas v. Waddell, et al,No. 05-1033 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam)
In City of Dallas v. Saucedo-Falls, the City had asserted a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and attorneys fees against the plaintiffs' suit complaining about denial of a pay raise, but had later filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and sought dismissal. Plaintiffs successfully argued in the trial court and on appeal that the city had waived its immunity by its conduct. In deciding the City's interlocutory appeal in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court did not announce any new precedent, but remanded the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to argue any viable immunity waiver in the wake of the Legislature's enactment of a limited statutory waiver of local government immunity, which occurred while the case was pending, and its recent sovereign immunity decisions, specifically its holdings in Tooke v. Mexia, and its second opinion in an earlier case involving the City of Dallas, in which it found that the city had waived immunity by filing a claim for affirmative relief of its own. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006); Loc. Gov't Code §§271.151-.160.
In the Sweetwater case, which was factually similar, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea to the firefighters' claims and dismissed their suit with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs were successful in arguing that the "sue and be sued" language in the city' charter waived its immunity.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, had reversed long-standing precedent for that proposition when it decided Tooke v. City of Mexia and a batch of companion cases at the end of June last year. Following its newly established precedent, the Court thus reversed the Eastland Court of Appeal's judgment and sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs could proceed under the newly enacted legislation authorizing suits against local governments subject to certain limitations.
Cases cited:
Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994) (holding, in an action construing the compulsory school attendance law, that the Declaratory Judgments Act, by authorizing actions to construe legislative enactments and attorney fee awards, "necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards")
City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2006)
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006)
Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 n.1) (Tex. 1997)(waiver by conduct)
Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006)
Find terms: sovereign immunity, plea to the jurisdiction, immune from suit
March 9, 2007 - Supreme Court hands down two more opinions in appeals from suits by municipal fire fighters over compensation. The unifying theme in these cases is whether their employing local governments are immune from such suits. City of Dallas v. Dora Saucedo-Falls, et al.,No. 05-0973 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam) City of Sweetwater, Texas v. Waddell, et al,No. 05-1033 (Tex. Mar. 9, 2007)(per curiam)
In City of Dallas v. Saucedo-Falls, the City had asserted a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and attorneys fees against the plaintiffs' suit complaining about denial of a pay raise, but had later filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and sought dismissal. Plaintiffs successfully argued in the trial court and on appeal that the city had waived its immunity by its conduct. In deciding the City's interlocutory appeal in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court did not announce any new precedent, but remanded the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to argue any viable immunity waiver in the wake of the Legislature's enactment of a limited statutory waiver of local government immunity, which occurred while the case was pending, and its recent sovereign immunity decisions, specifically its holdings in Tooke v. Mexia, and its second opinion in an earlier case involving the City of Dallas, in which it found that the city had waived immunity by filing a claim for affirmative relief of its own. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006); Loc. Gov't Code §§271.151-.160.
In the Sweetwater case, which was factually similar, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea to the firefighters' claims and dismissed their suit with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs were successful in arguing that the "sue and be sued" language in the city' charter waived its immunity.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, had reversed long-standing precedent for that proposition when it decided Tooke v. City of Mexia and a batch of companion cases at the end of June last year. Following its newly established precedent, the Court thus reversed the Eastland Court of Appeal's judgment and sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs could proceed under the newly enacted legislation authorizing suits against local governments subject to certain limitations.
Cases cited:
Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994) (holding, in an action construing the compulsory school attendance law, that the Declaratory Judgments Act, by authorizing actions to construe legislative enactments and attorney fee awards, "necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards")
City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2006)
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006)
Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 n.1) (Tex. 1997)(waiver by conduct)
Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006)
Find terms: sovereign immunity, plea to the jurisdiction, immune from suit
Substitute Teacher Rejected Too Many Assignments - Loses Age Discrimination Suit
Low Rate of Accepting Assignments Dooms Substitute Teacher's Age Discrimination Suit; Summary Judgment for School District Affirmed
Lucille R. Kelley v. Humble I.S.D. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2007, pet. denied 8/17/07)(Alcala)
In this wrongful termination suit brought by a former substitute teacher under the state anti-discrimination statute, the First Court of Appeals holds that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, but nevertheless affirms the summary judgment for the school district, finding that she had failed to show that the reason given by the school district was pretextual.
The school district presented summary judgment evidence that Lucille Kelley had accepted a low number of teaching assignments in response to calls from the automated SubFinder scheduling system, and that she was fired for that reason. In a memorandum opinion, Justice Alcala holds that the Plaintiff had met her initial burden with evidence that she was replaced by younger subs, but that she had not overcome the district's proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing her: limited availability and low acceptance rate of assignments offered to her. Plaintiff's evidence that the school district's logs were not fully accurate did not establish pretext.
Justice Alcala also rejects Kelley's disparate treatment claim and claim of a general pattern of discrimination based on statistical evidence. Concluding that Kelley had failed to meet her burden to show that the school district's adverse employment action against her was a pretext for age discrimination, or that her age (69 at the time of termination) was a motivating factor in the school district's decision, the court of appeals affirms the summary judgment granted by he 164th District Court in the employer's favor.
Case law categories: Employment Law, School Law, ISD Cases
Find terms: Employment law, public employment, discharge, termination, education law, school districts, ISD, TCHRA, age discrimination, prime-facie case, burden-shifting analysis, pretext
Lucille R. Kelley v. Humble I.S.D. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2007, pet. denied 8/17/07)(Alcala)
In this wrongful termination suit brought by a former substitute teacher under the state anti-discrimination statute, the First Court of Appeals holds that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, but nevertheless affirms the summary judgment for the school district, finding that she had failed to show that the reason given by the school district was pretextual.
The school district presented summary judgment evidence that Lucille Kelley had accepted a low number of teaching assignments in response to calls from the automated SubFinder scheduling system, and that she was fired for that reason. In a memorandum opinion, Justice Alcala holds that the Plaintiff had met her initial burden with evidence that she was replaced by younger subs, but that she had not overcome the district's proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing her: limited availability and low acceptance rate of assignments offered to her. Plaintiff's evidence that the school district's logs were not fully accurate did not establish pretext.
Justice Alcala also rejects Kelley's disparate treatment claim and claim of a general pattern of discrimination based on statistical evidence. Concluding that Kelley had failed to meet her burden to show that the school district's adverse employment action against her was a pretext for age discrimination, or that her age (69 at the time of termination) was a motivating factor in the school district's decision, the court of appeals affirms the summary judgment granted by he 164th District Court in the employer's favor.
Case law categories: Employment Law, School Law, ISD Cases
Find terms: Employment law, public employment, discharge, termination, education law, school districts, ISD, TCHRA, age discrimination, prime-facie case, burden-shifting analysis, pretext
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